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Accounts of statistical learning, both implicit and explicit, often invoke predictive processes as cen-
tral to learning, yet practically all experiments employ non-predictive measures during training. We 
argue that the common theoretical assumption of anticipation and prediction needs clearer, more 
direct evidence for it during learning. We offer a novel experimental context to explore prediction, 
and report results from a simple sequential learning task designed to promote predictive behav-
iors in participants as they responded to a short sequence of simple stimulus events. Predictive 
tendencies in participants were measured using their computer mouse, the trajectories of which 
served as a means of tapping into predictive behavior while participants were exposed to very 
short and simple sequences of events. A total of 143 participants were randomly assigned to stimu-
lus sequences along a continuum of regularity. Analysis of computer-mouse trajectories revealed 
that (a) participants almost always anticipate events in some manner, (b) participants exhibit two 
stable patterns of behavior, either reacting to vs. predicting future events, (c) the extent to which 
participants predict relates to performance on a recall test, and (d) explicit reports of perceiving 
patterns in the brief sequence correlates with extent of prediction. We end with a discussion of im-
plicit and explicit statistical learning and of the role prediction may play in both kinds of learning.
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IntroductIon
To  what  extent  is  prediction  related  to  sequential  learning  and 
memory, and to implicit or explicit knowledge of that learning? In this 
paper, we offer a novel methodology that may help answer this ques-
tion, and present experimental results that suggest this methodology 
holds promise for connecting these phenomena: prediction, statistical 
learning, and explicit awareness. In brief, our experiment is a simple 
manual spatial-position tracking task, in which a participant’s behavior 
is tracked with the computer-mouse cursor. We are thus able to de-
tect predictive movements readily. We show that predictive behaviors 
emerge quickly in a simple short-sequence design, using 48-element 
sequences of varying grammatical regularity. Prediction, learning, and 
explicit knowledge all correlate strongly. 
Many researchers in diverse domains of cognitive science have 
identified  prediction  as  central  to  perception,  cognition,  and  ac-
tion  (Bar,  2009;  Bieri,  1955;  Bubic,  von  Cramon,  &  Schubotz, 
2010;  Cleeremans  &  McClelland,  1991;  Craik,  1943;  Elman,  1990; 
Enns & Lleras, 2008; Kveraga, Ghuman, & Bar, 2007; Neisser, 1976; 
Ramscar,  Yarlett,  Dye,  Denny,  &  Thorpe,  2010;  Rao  &  Sejnowski, 
2003; Reynolds, Zacks, & Braver, 2007; Schubotz, 2007; Shelhamer & 
Joiner, 2003; Sutton & Barto, 1998; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001). This 
has been especially true of theories of statistical learning (Cleeremans 
&  McClelland,  1991;  Hoffmann,  Martin,  &  Schilling,  2003;  Hunt 
& Aslin, 2001; Nissen & Bullemer, 1987; Stadler, 1989). As we argue 
below, these theories are almost always based on indirect evidence for 
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http://www.ac-psych.org 2012 • volume 8(2) • 196-209 197
(SRT) experiments employ reaction-time (RT) methods that do not 
reveal predictive behaviors during learning (D. J. Marcus, Karatekin, 
& Markiewicz, 2006). Yet such experiments cannot mediate between 
predictive, forward-looking theories of statistical learning processes 
(Cleeremans & McClelland, 1991; Nissen & Bullemer, 1987), and theo-
ries that could be based more on associative memory traces that link 
event to event, and need not invoke forward-looking learning proces- 
ses (e.g., Jones & Pashler, 2007). The former family of theories needs a 
more direct technique to tap prediction and to support this common 
assumption. 
In this paper, we develop a technique for capturing prediction be-
havior directly, and present a simple experimental demonstration of 
it that speaks to this theoretical issue. Our results show that even if a 
brief sequential pattern is sufficiently ordered, participants begin to ac-
tively predict what stimulus will follow from a previous one, revealing 
prediction as a wholesale, active strategy. Participants who do so more 
also tend to report more explicit awareness of pattern in that stimulus 
sequence. Our data suggest that indeed prediction is central to learn-
ing and awareness, and may reveal how different forms of prediction 
may correlate with implicit or explicit awareness, which themselves 
are dependent upon the relative transparency of the structure being 
learned. In what follows, we first briefly review theoretical issues, and 
argue  that  predictive  versus  associative  mechanisms  can  easily  be 
confounded in statistical learning experiments. We then present our 
experimental results, and discuss their theoretical implications in the 
general discussion. 
Predictive versus associative 
processes for learning
Distinguishing  between  predictive  and  associative  learning  mecha-
nisms is a problem that extends across many domains in cognitive 
psychology, given that “...efficient processing of events in ambiguous 
contexts does not need to result from effective preparation, but retro-
spective use of information regarding events which occurred following 
those of interest” (Bubic et al., 2010, p. 2). Some studies have sought to 
tease apart these two potential mechanisms, predictive versus retro-
spective processing, in behavioral experiments. For example, Enns and 
Lleras (2008) showed that visual search from a recent scene in memory 
can be so fast (“rapid resumption”) that only a predictive mechanism 
could sensibly explain their findings. They noted that this is in contrast 
to fluid access to recent memory, characteristic of more retrospective 
processes. These same issues are faced by RT facilitation findings in 
sequential tasks that reveal statistical learning. 
Consider the findings of Hunt and Aslin (2001), whose study is 
similar to the design we employed here. They evaluated movement 
speed to predictable stimuli within a visuospatial layout. In their ex-
periment, the stimuli corresponded to seven lights that were arranged 
equidistantly in a semicircle. Participants were instructed to press the 
lights and then return to a fixed position below the lights to trigger 
the next position. They showed learning of predictable positions across 
trials of the experiment, finding that RTs were fastest for stimuli in 
predictable positions. 
Though Hunt and Aslin (2001) were primarily interested in the 
type of cues that underlie learning in this serial-reaction design, the 
cognitive process that was assumed to be operating in this context was 
one of an anticipatory nature: “If it [RT] was faster, this implied that 
the participant was relatively more certain about the subsequent ele-
ment in the sequence of stimuli and was able to anticipate the correct 
transition and produce a faster response” (p. 670). One issue with this 
general assumption is that faster latencies may simply reflect a capaci- 
ty to react more quickly given the strength of local “memory traces” 
induced during learning. As another example, in a recent computa-
tional model of SRT learning, Jamieson and Mewhort (2009) require 
only very local memory cuing, and the model by itself is not equipped 
with a predictive mechanism. It is in fact retrospective (in the sense of 
Bubic et al., 2010) because the generation of any new response is car-
ried out through integrating information from the previous stimulus 
and response, and with this simple local process, it can capture a wide 
range of basic statistical-learning results. A forward-looking model 
would produce expectations or anticipations for the next stimulus. 
This is an important distinction that should not be trivialized. The 
relevance of a current stimulus is evaluated when it is seen in a retro-
spective model, rather than before it is seen, which is how a predictive, 
anticipatory process would function. So a memory-based retrospective 
process could facilitate these responses in some manner, without being 
explicitly predictive. In short, the current stimulus is simply faster to 
process when it is seen.
The  distinction  between  predictive  and  retrospective  processes 
can be strengthened by considering two ways in which computational 
models could capture response facilitation. In a sequential statistical 
learning experiment, where we attempt to model the processing of 
some stimulus SN that has followed from some previous set of stimuli 
(SN-1, SN-2, etc.), there are two ways in which speeded processing of SN 
might  happen.  A  retrospective  model  would  process  this  SN  more 
quickly if its (activated) memory traces for preceding material facilitate 
that processing. No preparation or prediction is required for this to be 
so: Any of various processes required for evaluating the new SN could 
be facilitated by having relevant recent representations active before 
SN. A predictive model, however, does not wait to be facilitated in this 
processing. Instead, it would in some manner or another have at least 
part of the requisite processing of SN already in place even before SN 
appears, because seeing SN-1, SN-2, etc. together encourages the system 
to “look forward” towards upcoming stimulus events. There is a com-
putational  precedent  for  this  distinction.  In  the  retrospective  case, 
McClelland (1979) introduced a cascade algorithm to model facilitated 
processing time in an associative feedforward network. In the predic-
tive case, the well-known simple-recurrent network architecture has 
been used to model SRT and statistical learning data (Cleeremans & 
McClelland, 1991; Misyak, Christiansen, & Tomblin, 2009). Yet neither 
of these processes, prima facie, is fundamentally or a priori the most 
desirable. We would agree that statistical learning studies offer consi- 
derable evidence that anticipation is pervasive. Despite this pervasive-
ness, some recent works suggest that this pervasiveness should not be 
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http://www.ac-psych.org 2012 • volume 8(2) • 196-209 198
such a central mechanism, and its benefits, ought to be obtained (e.g., 
Jones & Pashler, 2007).
The vast majority of research on statistical learning has employed 
indirect measures of anticipation. Reber (1967) used grammatical en-
dorsement scores in test phases as evidence of learning. Looking time 
has been used in statistical learning studies with infants and young 
children  (see  Saffran,  2003, for a review). SRT studies virtually all 
use basic RT measures in training phases, from Nissen and Bullemer 
(1987) onward. There are a few studies that reveal anticipatory tenden-
cies, such as those that show the emergence of predictive errors in SRT 
studies (e.g., Schvaneveldt & Gomez, 1998), yet these predictive errors 
may still be evidence of some learning having already taken place. In 
other words, prediction may not have been part of the learning process, 
but rather an effect. There is indeed some good evidence that ocular 
and manual movements display predictive behaviors during statisti-
cal  learning  and  that  this  prediction  relates  to  explicit  knowledge.   
D. J. Marcus et al. (2006) showed that eye-movement anticipations are 
frequent in an SRT task, and relate to learning and explicit knowledge. 
Duran and Dale (2009) showed some weak evidence for anticipatory 
manual responses in a statistical learning paradigm similar to Saffran, 
Aslin, and Newport (1996; see also Moisello et al., 2009). The current 
experiment complements these findings and supplies a potential ex-
perimental framework for systematic exploration of prediction, and 
possibly, different types of prediction strategies. For example, here we 
show that manual anticipation can take on two different forms: “opti-
mized” reaction (where one readies the response but does not try to 
make it beforehand), and explicit “wagers,” which appear to accompany 
explicit learning, in which a participant actually heads for the next ex-
pected stimulus prior to its appearance. In our experiment, we observe 
that participants first find an optimal cursor location from which to 
react while waiting for another stimulus to appear (without predicting 
a specific stimulus), though at some point during the experiment they 
become aware of a pattern and begin to explicitly predict or “wager” its 
next occurrence. Once they do predict, it becomes a stable strategy that 
guides learning of a short sequence.
In  summary,  most  statistical  learning  experiments,  whether 
explicit or implicit in their learning outcomes, are based on indirect 
information  about  anticipatory  processes  consistent  with  both  an-
ticipatory and non-anticipatory types of models. We would agree with 
many researchers who have argued that anticipation seems to be the 
most appealing cognitive process for handling events in time (as cited 
above, and as discussed in the implicit learning literature, e.g., in D. J. 
Marcus et al., 2006; Nissen & Bullemer, 1987; Schvaneveldt & Gomez, 
1998; Stadler, 1989). But obtaining direct evidence of this process, and 
developing an empirical framework to further explore prediction in 
statistical learning, would further help to connect this mechanism for 
learning during learning. 
In this paper, we are not arguing that implicit learning is either 
purely associative or predictive, for it may be that they both work to-
gether during learning (and indeed, predictions may use associative 
mechanisms at root; e.g., Bar, 2009). Our point is that theories that use 
concepts of prediction could be further supported by directly reveal-
ing prediction in behavior. The purpose of this paper is to showcase 
an experimental paradigm that can reveal predictive processes, and 
to explore the properties of this anticipation/prediction as it relates to 
memory for sequences and explicit knowledge of the regularity of these 
sequences. We indeed find rich patterns of prediction, and this predic-
tion relates to learning and explicit awareness of that learning.  
ExpErImEnt
Here, we use an experimental design that reveals manual prediction, 
and we investigate the properties of this behavior. To provide an unam-
biguous measure of prediction, we turned to the measurement of hand 
movement during task performance. In several recent studies, the semi-
continuous movements of the computer-mouse cursor were regarded 
as a direct and (occasionally) uninterrupted translation of unfolding 
cognitive  processes  (Song  &  Nakayama,  2009;  Spivey,  Grosjean,  & 
Knoblich, 2005). Motivated by this logic, we tracked participants’ com-
puter mouse as they clicked on a visual cue that moved around a spatial 
landscape on the computer screen. Every time the cue was clicked, it 
momentarily disappeared before reappearing in a new location. During 
this period of disappearance, the learner had an opportunity to predict 
the most likely region of reappearance of the cue (it is like a simplified 
version of the “Whac-A-Mole” classic arcade game that readers may 
be familiar with). By tracking the coordinates of the computer-mouse, 
results can show when (or if) participants manually gravitate towards 
predictable regions. We used this in a simple sequence-learning task, in 
the spirit of Nissen and Bullemer (1987) and of Hunt and Aslin (2001). 
The task requires participants to respond to spatial stimuli that occur 
in sequences that vary in their ordering regularities. 
Methods
ParticiPants 
We  recruited  143  participants  from  Amazon  Mechanical  Turk 
(www.mturk.com).  This  system  has,  in  several  previous  studies, 
produced extremely reliable respondents even in relatively cognitive-
intensive tasks such as data coding (Kittur, Chi, & Suh, 2008; Snow, 
O’Connor, Jurafsky, & Ng, 2008; Sorokin & Forsyth, 2008). Our par-
ticipants were compensated with a small monetary reward for the task, 
which required approximately 10-15 min.
stimuli and interface 
The interface was programmed using Adobe Flash, in which the 
computer-mouse cursor could be accessed for its x and y coordinates 
at a rate of approximately 40 Hz. The interface occupied a 500-by-500-
pixel region within the users’ Internet browser (see Figure 1, Panel A). 
Target stimuli were 35-pixel-diameter black circles that appeared indi-
vidually during training, arrayed in a 2 × 2 grid. Participants used only 
their computer pointer to interact with the interface.
We  constructed  11  training  sequences  of  48-circle  appearances 
using the constraint that a circle in one position could not appear con-
secutively. In addition, each position (1-4) appeared an equal number 
of times. Each sequence contained an order of circle positions of vary-AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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Figure 1.
Panel A. stimuli locations on computer screen. Panel B. example region for reactive and predictive movements when mouse position is 
recorded after disappearance of stimulus t-1 and at the onset of stimulus t (750 ms lapsed). Panel c. hypothetical trajectory examples 
for illustration of predictive/reactive categories during the 750-ms inter-stimulus interval. (note that open circles reflect no stimuli on 
the screen, but indicate stimulus t and t-1.)
tAble 1. 
the stimulus sequences by circle Position
n Sequence G
11 4−2−3−2−1−2−1−2−4−1−3−2−1−4−1−3−1−3−2−4−1−3−1−3−1−4−2−4−3−4−2−4−1−3−1−4−2−3−2−4−1−4−2−3−4−3−2−3 .25
14 1−2−3−1−3−1−2−1−2−1−3−4−3−4−1−2−4−2−4−2−4−3−1−2−4−3−4−2−4−3−4−3−1−2−3−4−2−1−3−4−2−1−3−1−3−4−2−1 .40
16 2−1−4−3−4−3−2−4−1−2−3−2−1−2−1−4−3−4−3−2−3−2−3−2−1−3−2−1−4−1−4−1−4−3−4−1−2−1−4−1−4−3−2−3−2−3−4−1 .44
11 4−2−3−4−2−1−3−1−3−1−3−1−3−4−2−4−2−4−2−1−3−1−3−1−3−4−2−3−4−2−1−3−1−3−4−1−2−1−2−4−2−4−2−1−3−4−2−4 .55
11 4−3−4−3−4−3−2−1−4−3−2−1−4−3−2−1−4−3−2−1−4−3−2−1−3−2−1−4−3−2−1−3−2−1−2−1−4−3−2−1−2−1−4−3−4−2−1−4 .68
13 3−2−3−2−4−1−3−2−4−1−4−1−3−2−3−2−3−2−4−1−3−2−4−1−3−2−3−2−4−1−3−2−4−1−4−1−3−2−4−1−4−1−4−1−4−1−3−2 .76
10 2−3−1−4−1−4−1−4−2−3−1−4−2−3−1−4−2−3−1−4−2−3−1−4−2−3−2−3−2−3−2−3−1−4−1−4−2−3−1−4−2−3−1−4−2−3−1−4 .79
15 2−3−4−1−2−3−4−1−2−3−2−3−4−1−2−3−4−1−2−3−4−1−2−3−4−1−2−3−4−1−4−1−2−3−4−1−2−3−4−1−2−3−4−1−2−3−4−1 .89
15 2−1−3−4−2−1−3−4−2−1−3−4−2−1−3−4−2−1−3−4−2−1−3−4−2−1−3−4−2−1−3−4−2−1−3−4−2−1−3−4−2−1−3−4−2−1−3−4 1.0
14 1−2−4−3−1−2−4−3−1−2−4−3−1−2−4−3−1−2−4−3−1−2−4−3−1−2−4−3−1−2−4−3−1−2−4−3−1−2−4−3−1−2−4−3−1−2−4−3 1.0
11 4−3−2−1−4−3−2−1−4−3−2−1−4−3−2−1−4−3−2−1−4−3−2−1−4−3−2−1−4−3−2−1−4−3−2−1−4−3−2−1−4−3−2−1−4−3−2−1 1.0
Note. Stimulus sequences were numbered as in Figure 1. n = number of subjects randomly assigned to this training sequence. G is a grammatical regularity score 
taken from Jamieson and Mewhort’s (2009) study of implicit learning. G = 1 – U(sequence)/U(random) where U(sequence) is equal to the first-order entropy of the 
sequence. This is simply equal to the entropy of the probability distribution of transitions from positions i to j: -∑i∑jpijlog(pij), where pij is the probability that position 
i will transition to symbol j. U(random) is equal to the first-order entropy of a fully random transition matrix Ri,j (excluding where i = j). AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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ing regularity. From Jamieson and Mewhort (2009), regularity (G) was 
defined as the extent to which a 48-position sequence is redundant.   
G lies between 0 (no regularity) and 1 (high regularity), and we chose 
an array of values of G for our 11 sequences, including three sequences 
with perfect regularity, with the aim of having highly regular sequences 
in which prediction would be observed. Table 1 details this redundancy 
statistic, the stimulus sequences, and the regularity of each. Sequences 
of growing regularity have emerging patterning of the four positions, 
with fewer and fewer irregular trials intervening between these pat-
terns.
Procedure 
Participation consisted of three phases: (a) the training sequence, 
(b) a recall test, and (c) a report of explicit knowledge. Once participants 
opted to perform our task, they were forwarded to the Flash interface 
in their browser. Upon entry, the experimental software randomly as-
signed participants to a training stimulus sequence (each participant 
just saw one sequence). Participants were instructed to click the dots 
as fast as possible, because the interface was administering a RT task. 
The mouse cursor was continually tracked for the 48-position train-
ing stimuli. Circles appeared only one at a time, with a 750-ms inter- 
stimulus interval between them. This provided ample time for par-
ticipants to initiate a predictive mouse movement. Following these re-
sponses, participants were prompted to produce a 24-position sequence 
from memory that matched what they had seen during training (akin 
to the “inclusion” task that likely marshals both implicit and explicit 
knowledge of the sequences; cf. Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2001).   
We tracked the circle positions that were clicked during this recall test. 
The four circle positions were all on the screen for this part of the task. 
Finally, participants rated how patterned they felt the 48-element se-
quence was by clicking on a continuous scale between not patterned to 
completely patterned with somewhat patterned in between.
measures and analyses 
We continually tracked the computer-mouse x,y-pixel coordinates 
during training. For each position appearance (of 48), we calculated 
two main measures on which our analyses are based: (a) initial distance 
(in pixels) to the next position and (b) initial distance (in pixels) from 
the previous position. For (a), we computed the pixel distance to the 
next target just before it appeared (at the 750-ms mark), which we call 
initial distance to next. If participants are making a perfect predictive 
movement, the initial distance will be 0 (i.e., right on top of the next 
circle position). A reactive behavior, by contrast, will have a larger 
initial distance, either near the previous target (“waiting”) or near the 
center (“readying”). However, for (b), a movement may be predictive 
but simply incorrect. We therefore also calculated the maximum hori-
zontal/vertical distance from the previous target (at the 750-ms mark), 
which we call initial distance from previous. If a movement is predictive 
at all, it will have a large distance from previous, regardless of whether 
it is correct or not (see Figure 1, Panel B). As we describe further in the 
analysis below, these two measures provide windows onto predictive 
wagers of participants, and capture when participants are willing to in-
vest mouse-cursor movements in a particular predicted stimulus. Any 
other trial, when the cursor does not make a large movement towards 
a particular stimulus, we term a reactive trial. Hypothetical illustrations 
of these trajectories are provided in Figure 1 (Panel C).
We also calculated the regularity of the test recall sequence, and 
its similarity to the corresponding training sequence that a participant 
saw. This is detailed below.
Results
analysis of reaction times 
In an initial analysis, we simply tested whether our data indeed 
reflected traditional reaction-time facilitation across levels of sequence 
regularity (G score). In most statistical learning experiments, a control 
round using random sequences is used, to see whether RT or other 
measures are affected by the sudden change in the statistical structure 
of event sequences. Here, sequences of different G serve as relative, 
between-subject comparisons. We used a linear mixed-effects model 
with Subject as a random factor (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008), 
and Sequence Regularity G (0-1), Trial (1-48), and their interaction, as 
continuous fixed factors. G strongly predicted lower RT in this model, 
with each successive .1 increase in regularity leading to, on average, 
approximately 25 ms of facilitation, F(1, 139) = 42.5, p < .0001. There 
was also a significant effect of trial, with RT dropping by about 2 ms 
per trial, F(1, 6350) = 303.1, p < .0001. Importantly, these two factors 
interact, with high G sequences dropping more over trials than low G 
sequences, F(1, 6350) = 132.8, p < .0001. We therefore conclude that 
by a traditional analysis of RTs, we are able to show the same kind of 
results as found in previous work. The question, however, is whether 
these RT facilitation patterns can be accounted for by predictive move-
ments. If so, then facilitation will arise from predictive mouse-cursor 
movements that get closer and closer to where the next trial stimulus 
will appear, even before the stimulus appears on the screen. We explore 
this possibility in the next two analyses.
correct Predictive movements 
The overall extent to which participants moved the mouse cursor 
towards the next target prior to the target’s appearance was strongly 
related to the regularity of the grammar. This is shown in Panel A 
of  Figure  2.  Using  the  same  model  as  described  above,  G  highly 
significantly predicted initial distance to next. Each .1 increase in G 
on average led to about a 25-pixel closer initial position to the next 
target, F(1, 139) = 125.7, p < .0001. In general, each subsequent trial 
reduced initial position by about 1 pixel, F(1, 6351) = 174.2, p < .0001, 
but this depended upon G, indicated by a significant interaction term,   
F(1, 6351) = 161.2, p < .0001. In other words, high-G values (i.e., greater 
regularity) had a larger drop in initial position across trials compared 
to sequences with low-G values. 
Predictive movements 
We examined whether participants moved away from the previous 
target position using initial distance from previous. As described in 
the Measures and Analyses section above, if participants do not move AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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at all, or only move towards the center, then this would be a “reactive” 
trial, because participants are only preparing for the next target to ap-
pear. However, if participants move away by a certain pixel distance, 
then they are likely moving the mouse cursor towards another target 
(either correctly or incorrectly). Such a trial would be a predictive one. 
Figure 2 (Panel B) shows the increase in initial distance from previous 
across sequence regularities. In short, participants become more pre-
dictive in the high-G sequences than low-G sequences. All the same 
effects hold in the same mixed-effects model (ps < .0001; we excluded 
the first trial from these analyses, as there is no previous trial to obtain 
such a measure). As suggested by the previous analysis, and in general, 
the extent to which predictive behaviors occurred over trials depended 
upon the predictability of the sequence itself. 
reactive-Predictive strategies 
Simply averaging over participants (as in Figure 2) does not reveal a 
stark bimodality in predictive tendencies that we observed in our par-
ticipants. To showcase this bimodality, we used the previous dependent 
measure (distance away from previous trial) and conducted distribu-
tion analyses. In the 48-position trials, any individual trial was deemed 
“predictive” when the initial distance from previous was 275 pixels or 
greater (indicating substantial movement away, likely to another target; 
see Panel B of Figure 1). We calculated the proportion of trials that 
were predictive in six-trial blocks (giving eight blocks). For any given 
block for each subject, a proportion score is obtained, lying between 
0 and 1, representing the extent to which that block was predictive.   
A  score  of  1  on  this  proportion  would  indicate  that  all  trials  of 
these 6 were predictive. A score of 0 would indicate only reaction: 
Participants stayed closer to their initial position prior to the next 
trial. For each block, 1 to 8, a distribution of 143 scores is obtained   
(see Figure 3). 
Each of these distributions is different from an assumed histo-
gram of a uniform distribution of prediction proportions, χ(6)s > 30,   
ps  <  .0001.  In  the  first  block,  participants  are  primarily  reactive. 
Gradually, participants exhibit a sharp bimodal distribution in the 
final block. In inspecting the same histograms but for individual se-
quences, the distribution is as one would predict from the aforemen-
tioned analyses: High-G sequences have participants that transition to 
fully predictive trials; low-G sequences have participants that mostly 
remain reactive; bimodality holds approximately in the intermediate 
sequences.
Prediction occurs before correct Prediction 
We compared initial distance to next (correct prediction) and initial 
distance from previous (overall predictive movements) across blocks. 
If prediction occurs before knowledge, then overall prediction should 
be significantly higher at a crucial period as prediction emerges. Figu- 
re 4 shows the first four blocks of the three perfectly regular sequences, 
for  which  prediction  was  stable  and  frequent  in  participants.  At   
Block 2, trials tended to be more predictive overall rather than simply 
correctly predictive. We generated a score from 0 to 6 for each block for 
each subject, computed by subtracting the number of correct predic-
tions (using a conservative 100-pixel threshold) from the number of 
overall predictions by initial distance from previous (using the same 
275-pixel threshold). In Blocks 1, 3, and 4 this score did not differ sig-
nificantly from 0, as expected from Figure 4, ts < 1.9, ps = .10, .09, and 
.07, respectively. However, in Block 2, this score is substantially posi-
tive across these participants, t(39) = 5.1, p < .0001. This indicates that 
at about Block 2, there is more prediction in general than just correct 
prediction. In short, prediction generally appears to occur prior to total 
correct knowledge about the sequences.
do the ParticiPants recall correctly? 
We  calculated  the  grammatical  regularity  of  the  participants’ 
testing  output  of  24  clicks  using  the  same  statistic  as  in  Jamieson 
and  Mewhort  (2009).  In  the  expected  direction,  there  is  a  strong 
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Figure 2.
Panel A. distance (in pixels and as a function of sequence regularity, g) to next stimuli after 750-ms lapse between disappearance of 
previous stimuli and onset of next stimuli. Panel B. distance from previous stimuli after 750-ms lapse.
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relationship between the G-score regularity of the training sequence 
and the testing recall, r = .42, p < .0001. We also found that the testing 
sequences more closely matched the original training sequences in the 
same direction, r = .48, p < .0001. This matching score was generated 
using a sequence-alignment method known as cross-recurrence (see 
Dale & Spivey, 2005), where a percentage score reflects the overall 
match  between  the  original  and  testing  sequences  by  calculating 
the percentage of position sequences that are the same (similar to 
Levenshtein distance). In addition, we tested the relationship between 
how predictive a participant is in the final two blocks of the experi-
ment  (12  trials,  using  distance  from  previous  with  275-pixel  thre- 
shold), and the matching score, controlling for the training sequence 
G-scores  (included  as  a  covariate  in  a  linear  multiple-regression 
model). In the total model, training sequence G-score is a significant 
predictor (p < .01), but amount of prediction also strongly relates to 
the matching score (p < .005; multiple-R2 = .29, p < .0001). The rela-
tionship between matching score, and G, and predictiveness, is shown   
in Figure 5. 
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Figure 3.
the percentage of participants (from all 11 G-score sequences) that exhibit reactive (proportion prediction = 0) or predictive (propor-
tion prediction = 1) response modes across 48-position sequences divided into eight blocks. (note that Block 1 shows 6 bins because 
Block 7 contained no participants. this 0 was included in the analysis, however.)
Figure 4.
the distribution of trials in correct predictions (black line) and any predictive movement at all (dotted line). As seen in Block 2, overall 
prediction represents a larger proportion of the trials (approximately 70%) than correct prediction by itself (50%). in other blocks, 
prediction and correct prediction overlap closely.
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The  same  finding  held  for  the  relationship  between  prediction 
and test recall G-score (for prediction: p < .0001, multiple-R2 = .41,   
p < .0001). Interestingly, when factoring in how predictive participants 
are,  training  sequence  G-score  was  no  longer  a  significant  predic-
tor of the 24-item test recall G-score (p = .9). This suggests that the 
regularity of a participant’s memories for the sequences is somehow 
dependent  upon  their  tendencies  to  actively  predict  the  positions. 
Therefore, when controlling for the training sequence’s G-score, the 
tendency of participants to be predictive relates significantly to their 
performance on the test in both the free-response regularity and match   
to the training.
exPlicit awareness correlates  
with all measures
Participants  who  deemed  the  sequences  to  be  more  patterned 
tended to be the ones who had training sequences of higher G, r = .41, 
p < .0001. Higher explicit awareness of pattern related to greater test 
match to the training sequences, r = .47, p < .0001, and greater predic-
tive behavior in the final 12 trials, r = .51, p < .0001. We ran a separate 
regression analysis to test for the relationship between prediction and 
explicit awareness while controlling for other variables, because predic-
tion on the last 12 trials related significantly to these as well. First, we 
used the G score of a training sequence to predict perception of explicit 
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Figure 5.
Panel A. test sequence match score (%) as a function of G, with means grouped by stimulus condition. Panel B. Using the same stimu-
lus list means, the match score as a function of predictiveness.
Figure 6.
Panel A. Pattern awareness, a continuous-scale score from 100 to 400 (based on a clicked icon on the computer screen) as a function of 
G, means grouped by stimulus list. Panel B. Pattern awareness score as a function of overall predictiveness proportion, means grouped 
by stimulus list condition.
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awareness, and saved the residuals. When the G score was factored out 
of explicit awareness in this way, predictive tendencies still significantly 
accounted for what was left over in those residuals, r = .27, p = .005. The 
reverse is not true: Once prediction behavior is taken out of explicit 
awareness, G score is no longer significantly related to these residuals,   
r = .08, p = .4, suggesting that prediction mediates between a sequence’s 
regularity and explicit awareness. We chose to use participants’ test 
sequence generation’s match to training as an additional measure of 
explicit awareness, and both prediction and test recall correlated with 
explicit  awareness,  even  when  controlling  for  each  other,  rs > .25,   
ps < .005. The relationship between awareness score, and G, and pre-
dictiveness, is shown in Figure 6.
is there really imPlicit learning at all?
It is important to reiterate that the current experiment is a very 
short one, using brief exposure on a simple sequence of four positions. 
Nevertheless, we sought to test whether there was any sign of implicit 
learning. As noted above, most statistical learning experiments use a 
control round with random (or different) sequences to see whether 
RT or other measures are increased by the change in the structure of 
sequences. Again, sequences of different G serve as relative, between-
subject comparisons. If there is any implicit learning then participants 
who have low pattern awareness should nevertheless show improve-
ment in RT across trials, moderated by the relative level of regularity in 
the sequence, as captured by G. We chose a subset of our participants 
who  reported  lower  awareness  of  pattern  (below  but  not  equal  to 
“somewhat patterned,” n = 25), and ran a linear mixed-effects regres-
sion with Subject as a random factor, and G, and Trial (1-48) as fixed 
factors, and included an interaction term. G was not alone significant, 
F(1, 29) = 2.1, p = .16, though trial was, F(1, 1404) = 19.9, p < .001.   
G and Trial interacted significantly, F(1, 1404) = 6.5, p = .01. The pat-
tern of this interaction was as expected: The higher G sequences in-
duced more learning across trials relative to lower G sequences. These 
participants reported low awareness of sequence pattern, and never-
theless showed modulated RTs relative to the regularity of the structure 
they received. This is at least suggestive of implicit learning in this brief 
exposure. As expected from previous analyses above, these participants 
also have significantly less predictive behavior in the final 12 trials than 
the remainder (n = 99) of the participants, p < .05.
Discussion
These  extensive  analyses  of  our  data  offer  some  basic  ideas  about 
prediction and statistical learning, and their relationship to the im-
plicit/explicit divide. First, prediction in the form of a “behavioral 
wager” tends to rapidly emerge as participants detect structure in the 
sequence. It is a stable strategy that does not seem to happen as a re-
sult of learning, but instead seems to occur in conjunction with early 
moments of learning. The results showing that incorrect prediction 
occurs as participants are transitioning into this predictive “mode” 
supports this. Below we further consider a “two system” hypothesis 
related to this: When an implicit learning process extracts sufficient 
structure, the cognitive system can “seek out” a forthcoming stimulus, 
thus producing an error signal, and kick starting explicit awareness   
and learning. 
Second, explicit awareness measures (recall memory and awareness 
report) both correlate strongly with predictive behavior, even when 
controlling for sequence regularity. Thus, explicit knowledge appears 
to co-occur with “wagers” that participants are willing to invest in 
when they become aware of some structure. It may be that a particular 
kind of prediction (for a particular stimulus) is related to processes that 
unfold under conditions of conscious awareness. 
As a final note, we observed that participants who did not wager of-
ten adopted the “centering” strategy that Duran and Dale (2009) found 
in their spatial statistical learning experiment. Participants anticipated 
the next stimulus, which occurred at one of three other locations, by 
positioning the mouse cursor at an optimal location, equidistant from 
the next stimulus (i.e., in the center). As we discuss further below, 
this may not be best described as reactive, as we have categorized it in 
our analysis, but rather an optimal anticipatory positioning close to 
possible future stimuli. Even participants with low pattern awareness 
engaged in this form of behavior. 
GEnEral dIscussIon
Admittedly, we designed a very simple task, and used it to explore 
initial response tendencies. Results thus reflect the processing of short-
term event sequences that may be routinely faced by cognitive systems 
during daily activities (e.g., observing or producing brief structured 
action sequences; Botvinick & Plaut, 2004). Our experiment simplified 
this ecological context, and exposed participants to a single stream of 
visuospatial information. Certainly, the experiment is not of the same 
scope of traditional statistical learning and of SRT tasks, which use 
more complex sequences over many blocks of training. In that respect, 
what we are revealing is the very beginning of the learning system’s 
behavior,  using  computer-mouse  trajectories  to  unveil  the  “micro-
structure” of this initial processing. 
Results do suggest that the cognitive system, at least with respect 
to the manual motor system, is not constantly predicting the next 
particular stimulus event, especially in random environments. Instead, 
it adapts a readiness to respond, which may transition sharply into 
prediction once some regularity appears to be present. From here, 
prediction permits the generation of error (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; 
Sutton & Barto, 1998), whereas simple reaction does not. From basic 
learning theory (Miller, Barnet, & Grahame, 1995), to more complex 
computational approaches of the past couple of decades (e.g., Elman, 
1990), prediction is a wager the outcome of which leads to adjusted 
future expectations. It may be from such contingencies that deeply 
entrenched learning ensues. 
Though our experimental findings appear robust, there are clear 
limitations to the current approach, which we hope to overcome in 
future investigations. Our simple design was deliberately short, seek-
ing to observe and relate prediction in stimuli that are only brief. The 
optimal simultaneous “mixed strategy” (for middle G-scores), in which 
participants  might  both  wager/center  in  predictable/unpredictable AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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positions, is not observed but may emerge after extended training. 
Another issue, mentioned above in our experimental discussion, is that 
our participants often engaged in a consistent “centering” strategy. This 
is not mere reaction, as one would call the “wait and respond” strategy; 
yet it is not overt prediction either because participants are placing 
the cursor in an optimal position to react. Future work may seek to 
identify perhaps diverse response strategies that have various aspects 
of optimality depending on the task structure and instructions at hand, 
and could identify individual differences in this capacity to predict, 
either as an explicit or implicit strategy, which may relate to tendencies 
in other tasks (e.g., Proulx & Heine, 2009). In addition, our aggregate 
measures of memory may have underestimated the amount of explicit 
learning achieved during the task. It may be that explicit knowledge 
reported during the test is simply organized around particular sub-
sequences (e.g., “4−3−2−1”). Given the small number of participants 
per sequence, a statistical test of this hypothesis cannot be conducted 
here.  Indeed,  future  work  may  demonstrate  that  computer-mouse 
movements form organized hierarchical units of predictive patterns, 
as suggested in work that models the organization of action sequences 
(e.g., Botvinick & Plaut, 2004). This would also bear on models that 
hypothesize  different  unitization  of  emerging  statistical  knowledge 
(e.g., Perruchet & Vinter, 1998).
We also focused on manual prediction tendencies, and did not 
look at oculomotor prediction. Previous work has shown the eyes to 
be widely predictive and the extent of this predictiveness to be related 
to explicit learning (D. J. Marcus et al., 2006), suggesting reactive-
predictive strategies in oculomotor control could function distinctively 
(see also Land & Furneaux, 1997; Shelhamer & Joiner, 2003). Despite 
this potentially distinctive functioning, it is highly likely the unfolding 
of oculomotor and manual dynamics are coupled in natural contexts 
(Ballard, Hayhoe, & Pelz, 1995), and the relationship between their 
predictiveness could be explored with simple experiments like the one 
presented here. Indeed, the presence (or absence) of action contingen-
cies is something that researchers in implicit statistical learning have 
debated (e.g., Heyes & Foster, 2002; Mayr, 1996; Willingham, 1999). 
The role of predictive processes is considered by many as central to 
this coupling between perception, action, and the environment. We 
feel  our  experiment  could  fruitfully  connect  prediction,  statistical 
learning, and awareness of that learning in a single paradigm, and 
our results are suggestive of rich underlying relationships. We discuss   
this next.
Implicit/explicit divide:  
Two systems?
We should preface our discussion here with an important note: Our re-
sults are correlational in nature. Prediction and awareness of a pattern 
are correlated in our task, as observed in past research (D. J. Marcus et 
al., 2006; Willingham, Nissen, & Bullemer, 1989). Yet, this awareness 
does not necessarily mean that a complete, explicit knowledge of the 
exact sequencing has been formed. Controlling for explicit knowledge 
by factoring out test sequence match, we still find that prediction oc-
curs, suggesting that predictive behavior mediates the transition be-
tween a vague awareness of a pattern and the full-blown knowledge 
of that pattern (to which D. J. Marcus et al., 2006, also attest). Thus, 
explicit wagers of the kind we observe emerged rapidly in high G se-
quences, showcasing errors of prediction earlier in learning, and then 
settling into a stable strategy.  
One subtle aspect of the debate in statistical learning in the past 
decade has been the extent to which it is taken to be anticipatory in na-
ture (D. J. Marcus et al., 2006; Nissen & Bullemer, 1987; Schvaneveldt & 
Gomez, 1998; Stadler, 1989), or may be based on associative processes 
that need not always involve forward-looking mechanisms (Heyes & 
Foster, 2002; Jones & Pashler, 2007; Mayr, 1996). In fact, models used 
to capture this behavior have both properties as well, from local asso-
ciative traces to more predictive processes (see Cleeremans & Dienes, 
2008, for an elegant review of models). A tentative conjecture from 
our approach is that, as learners become acquainted with a sequential 
environment, their strategies may change depending on the regularity 
of that environment, and extent of exposure. 
These strategies could reveal distinct underlying systems at work 
during learning. For example, in a study by Schvaneveldt and Gomez 
(1998), it was observed that single- versus dual-task learning contexts 
may induce different sorts of processes, with differing capacities to 
transfer that learning. They found in particular that knowledge gained 
in single-task learning was not easily transferred to a dual-task context 
when  participants  switched.  Dual-task  learning,  however,  induced 
knowledge  that  was  transferrable  to  a  new  single-task  context.  As 
another example, previous researchers have debated the presence of 
two systems for learning, one based on attention to the material and 
the  other  not  requiring  attention  (e.g.,  Curran  &  Keele,  1993),  or 
whether just one system can account for such data (e.g., Frensch, Lin, 
& Buchner, 1998). Theoretical debate in implicit learning has often 
been geared towards identification of the subsystems involved, their 
properties, whether they operate alone or in parallel, and whether they 
produce abstract or concrete, or rule-based or statistical, knowledge 
(for reviews, see e.g., Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, & Boyer, 1998; Clegg, 
2005; Conway & Christiansen, 2006; Curran & Keele, 1993; Frensch 
et al., 1998; Jamieson & Mewhort, 2009; Keele, Ivry, Mayr, Hazeltine, 
& Heuer, 2003; Kirkham, Slemmer, & Johnson, 2002; G. F. Marcus, 
Vijayan, Bandi Rao, & Vishton, 1999; Perruchet & Pacton, 2006; Reber, 
1989; Seidenberg, 1999; Willingham & Goedert-Eschmann, 1999).
One may be tempted therefore to situate our results in this general 
trend to identify subsystems for learning. An implicit learning system 
may work to associate spatial positions over time, which facilitates 
spatial processing as they appear in sequence (debate also concerns 
whether there are subsystems here, regarding perceptual, attentional, 
and response-based bases; and recently there is suggestion that it could 
even exhibit modality specificity, cf. Conway & Christiansen, 2005). 
As sufficient structure is extracted by this general system, an “explicit” 
one kicks in, and participants begin to make explicit behavioral wagers 
about the next stimulus location. Indeed, there exists a prominent and 
related theory of cognitive control that also proposes two underlying 
modes of proactive and reactive operation (Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 
2007). Yet we agree with Cleeremans and Dienes (2008) that identifica-AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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tion of separate subsystems does not by itself count as an explanation 
of any data, and besides, as suggested, for example, in discussion by 
Kirkham,  Slemmer,  and  Johnson  (2002),  what  we  observed  could 
be  multiple  behavioral  strategies  emerging  from  a  single  general-
purpose learning system. In fact, the modeling work of Destrebecqz 
and Cleeremans (2003) includes both an associative and predictive 
component that could capture both patterns we observe here. It may 
be (as we discuss below), that participants can simply verbalize this 
single system’s operation in some contexts, such as when prediction 
is possible, versus others, such as when only equidistant positioning 
(“centering”) is possible. Finally, even if we were to propose such a two-
system explanation, further research is needed to judge whether, in our 
particular task, the associative, implicit system is still functioning even 
when overt behavior is overwhelmingly predictive (e.g., Willingham & 
Goedert-Eschmann, 1999).
Whatever the architectural description, there are clearly two strate-
gies or “modes” observed in our behavioral data. And what is new in 
our observations is that these modes can rapidly transition from one 
into the other, from reactive practices into tentative prediction, and 
then to wholesale wagering that gives way to consistently correct pre-
dictions. And despite our task’s simplicity, we were able to go beyond 
previous research, in which such modes of learning or operating in 
sequential tasks are shielded by the wonderfully easy to acquire yet 
aggregate measure of RT; this can mask any interesting microstruc-
ture of unfolding statistical learning. Very elegant experiments can 
be designed to capture strategies using this measure (e.g., error and 
probabilistic sequences; Schvaneveldt & Gomez, 1998), by focusing 
on the RT distribution itself (e.g., very-short RTs; Willingham et al., 
1989), or simply by inducing prediction during training or testing (e.g., 
Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2005); but in our design, the dynamics 
of prediction during learning are unveiled naturally and more trans-
parently. Future work could identify the modes of operating, and the 
principles that guide them, by exploiting the behavioral measures we 
used here (cf. Duran & Dale, 2009; Moisello et al., 2009; D. J. Marcus 
et al., 2006).
Implicit/explicit divide:  
Prediction and awareness
Previous studies have also found that indices of prediction correlate 
with explicit knowledge of the presence of regularity of a sequence 
(D. J. Marcus et al., 2006; Willingham et al., 1989), and our results 
replicate this connection. What is especially novel in our results, the 
study’s limitations notwithstanding, is that the time course of the onset 
of this prediction can be captured. The data reported here suggest that 
participants rapidly initiate prediction as a strategy that accompanies 
the acquisition of knowledge, rather than being a direct consequence 
of it (cf. D. J. Marcus et al., 2006). As mentioned at the outset of this 
paper, many researchers have identified prediction as a central pro- 
cess underlying much of perception, cognition, and action. It has been 
implicated in high-level cognitive processes, such as explicit awareness 
of causal agency (e.g., temporal relations in action-effect for judgment 
of authorship; Wegner, 2003) and self-awareness (see Jeannerod, 2006, 
for a review of relevant evidence), and even at lower levels, as a foun-
dational process of action and perception, since prominent theories of 
action control still propose that the cognitive system predicts the con-
sequences of actions (e.g., Hommel, 2009). Yet the fact that prediction 
seems to relate to implicit/explicit knowledge in statistical learning has 
not gained much theoretical attention.
One recent account that may explain why explicit prediction of 
the kind measured here – which we have often referred to as wagers 
– is the theory of Morsella (2005), which explains phenomenal states 
as emerging in cross-modal and integrative contexts that converge to 
control body plans. When diverse information (e.g., from multiple 
modalities) converges on action plans, the states that accompany such 
a condition have phenomenal properties that may function to bind 
these diverse information sources into a likeness of experience that 
we typically call consciousness, awareness, and so on. When wagering 
prediction occurs, it may reflect a convergence of information from 
prior  perception  and  action  experiences  that,  in  Morsella’s  (2005) 
terms,  interfere  with  ongoing  body  plans,  and  phenomenal  states 
reflect  the  cognitive  system’s  integration  or  binding  of  these  expe- 
riences in order to maintain skeletomotor control. In this sense, the 
strategy of explicit, stimulus-specific prediction must draw the motor 
system away from other possible association and drive the system to-
ward a particular location; implicit associative processes may involve 
parallel processes that compete more “benignly” and do not require 
phenomenal binding processes to anchor them. This proposed dis-
tinction can only be treated as gradient and approximate, however, 
because there is evidence for implicit predictions in statistical learning 
in other work (e.g., Turk-Browne, Scholl, Johnson, & Chun, 2010). It 
turns out that these more implicit process do seem to relate to visual 
prediction (e.g., Bar, 2009), where underlying associative representa-
tions  may  be  employed  for  relatively  implicit,  rapid  expectations; 
whereas in ours and previous studies, explicit awareness accompanies 
motoric  manifestations  of  prediction,  as  perhaps  Morsella  (2005) 
would hypothesize. Future research may reveal that prediction bears 
in different ways on perceptual and response-based implicit/explicit   
learning.
The  foregoing  discussion  is  not  meant  to  argue  that  explicit   
knowledge is required for learning, and indeed our data are suggestive 
of the early stages of implicit learning in very simple sequences. We also 
do not wish to take up the notion that implicit/explicit learning sys-
tems are architecturally distinct; there are other perspectives on these 
issues that do not necessarily require complete separation of processes 
or their resulting knowledge in order to account for experimental data, 
whether one rejects any such dissociation (e.g., Perruchet & Amorim, 
1992), or embraces a more gradient perspective on implicit/explicit 
knowledge (Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002). Regardless of one’s theo-
retical stance on architectural separation or distinct functioning modes 
of a single learning system, the surface behavior that is exhibited in 
this simple SRT task suggests that there are indeed different modes or 
strategies that emerge during learning. We would argue that the experi-
mental paradigm we have presented may help mitigate these kinds of 
theoretical debates.AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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This discussion is, of course, purely speculative with regard to the 
current experiment, and there is extensive discussion about explicit 
“conscious” awareness of such things as the actions that unfold dur-
ing everyday tasks, of why such actions have taken place, and of the 
learning that may take place during these actions (Cleeremans et al., 
1998; Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002; Cohen & Schooler, 1997; Haggard, 
Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002; Hurley, 2002; Jeannerod, 2006; Reber, 1992; 
Sarrazin, Cleeremans, & Haggard, 2008; Van Orden & Holden, 2002; 
Wegner, 2003), that we do not have space to consider here. The excite-
ment in the field regarding prediction, and the continued interest in 
consciousness as an outstanding puzzle of the cognitive sciences, may 
be a point of synergy between basic research on predictive cognition 
and philosophical discussion of explicit awareness of learning that 
takes place during everyday life. The field thus requires the develop-
ment of new techniques to tap predictive tendencies in laboratory 
contexts, and relate these tendencies to implicit or explicit processes 
that underlie statistical learning. We hope readers find the paradigm 
and experiment we offer here as a promising means by which this can 
be pursued to bridge the divide. 
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